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NEW YORK CITY AS ORGANIZED CRIME FIGHTER
JAMES

B. JACOBS & ALEX HORTIS*

This targeted criminal cartel is a "black hole" in New York City's
economic life. Like those dense stars found in the firmament, the
cartel cannot be seen and its existence can only be shown by its
effect on the conduct of (those) falling within its ambit. Because
of its strong gravitational field, no light escapes very far from a
"black hole" before it is dragged back ... [T]he record before us
reveals that from the cartel's domination of the commercial waste
industry, no carter escapes. Local Law 42 establishes a new
commission and regulatory scheme to address this pervasive
problem.'
For most of the twentieth century, Cosa Nostra has been deeply and
powerfully entrenched in the economy of New York City. It has been a
dominant force, in both sea and air cargo operations at the ports and
airports, the garment center, the Javits Exhibition Center as well as in the
construction industry and in commercial waste hauling.2 Although there
have been sporadic local, state, and federal law enforcement initiatives
against the mob since the early decades of the twentieth century, the U.S.
Department of Justice did not mount a concerted anti-organized crime
effort until the 1980s. 3 As U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New

*

James B. Jacobs is professor of law and director of the Center for Research in

Crime & Justice at the New York University School of Law. Alex Hortis is a third-year
law student at New York University School of Law. He served as a research assistant to
Professor James B. Jacobs.
1. Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 989 (2d
Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (upholding the constitutionality of Local Law 42).
2.

See JAMES B. JACOBS ET AL., BUSTING THE MOB: UNITED STATES V. COSA NOSTRA

23 (1994) [hereinafter

JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB]; Brian Carrol, Combating Racketeering
in the FultonFishMarket, in ORGANIZED CRIMEAND ITS CONTAINMENT: ATRANSATLANTIC

INITIATIVE 183 (Cyrille Fijnaut & James B. Jacobs eds., 1991) (providing an assessment
of organized crime in the Fulton Fish Market); NEW YORK STATE ORGANIZED CRIMETASK
FORCE, CORRUPTION AND RACKETEERING IN THE NEW YORK CITY CONSTRUCTION

INDUSTRY: THE FINALREPORT (1990) (presenting a study of racketeering in construction);
VIRGIL PETERSON, THE MOB: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN NEW YORK
(1983) (discussing the early history of organized crime in New York City).
3. See JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB, supra note 2, at 18.
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York from 1983 to 1989, Rudolph Giuliani played a major role in this
attack on Cosa Nostra. 4
When Giuliani became New York City's mayor in 1993, he committed
himself to purge Cosa Nostra from New York City's economy by using the
powers of City government. Through the creative use of regulatory
authority, especially licensing, the City launched a number of extraordinary
initiatives.
Giuliani demonstrated that the City Charter and City
government are flexible enough to deal successfully with problems long
thought inexorable and inevitable. The administration's unprecedented
initiatives have drawn the attention of law enforcement agencies and
governments all over the world. 5 At the cusp of the twenty-first century,
New York City has expanded the domain of local government to deal with
a criminal syndicate that, until recently, had seemed omnipotent.
This Article traces the creation, development, and strategic initiatives
of the Trade Waste Commission ("TWC"), a small New York City agency
established for the sole purpose of breaking up and eliminating the cartel
that had dominated commercial waste hauling in the city for fifty years.'
Part 1F describes Cosa Nostra's domination of the commercial waste hauling
industry. Part 118 traces the political developments leading up to the
establishment of the TWC. Part 1I1' sets out the structure, authority, and
staffing of this new agency. Part IV"0 explains the strategic initiatives that
the TWC has taken to break up the waste hauling cartel and to purge Cosa
Nostra from the industry. Part V" discusses the legal challenges to the
TWC. The conclusion reflects on the importance of the TWC as a model
for attacking entrenched corruption and racketeering in local government.

4. See id. at20, 80-81, 86, 89.
5. See, e.g., Conference on the Waste Industry: Italy-America Achieving a CrimeFree Market 288passim(1997) [hereinafter Conference] (discussing various aspects of New
York City Trade Waste Commission at international conference on organized crime inwaste
hauling).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra notes 12-51 and accompanying text.

8. See itfra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 69-116 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 131-163 and accompanying text.
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NEW YORK CITY AS ORGANIZED CRIME FIGHTER
I. THE NATURE OF COSA NOSTRA'S DOMINATION OF
NEW YORK CITY'S WASTE HAULING INDUSTRY

Cosa Nostra has controlled several national unions 12 and has conducted
international money laundering and drug smuggling operations. 13 It derives
much of its power from its domination of unions and businesses at local
and regional levels.' 4
Typically, Cosa Nostra used its control over union locals to organize
cartels.' 5 Cosa Nostra then enforced the cartels' rules by threatening
business disruption, labor problems, and personal violence. Competitors
were prevented from participating in the industry, and cartel members were
prevented from cheating. Cartel members forced industry participants and
consumers to pay inflated prices to receive the good or service controlled
by the cartel. The inflated price for goods and services6 passed along to
consumers has been called a "cartel tax" or "mob tax."'
The New York City waste hauling industry provides an excellent
example of a Cosa Nostra-sponsored cartel. As early as 1947, New York
City officials received reports that "illegal activities" were restricting
competition in certain small niches of waste hauling controlled by private
haulers. 7 Nonetheless, in 1956, Mayor Robert Wagner decided to
privatize waste hauling for commercial establishments.1 8 Suddenly, there
were approximately 52,000 new customers for private waste hauling

12. See, e.g., JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB, supra note 2, at 167-81 (describing civil
RICO suit to purge organized crime from the Teamsters union).
13. See, e.g., id. at 129-66 (describing the "Pizza Connection" case involving an
international drug smuggling ring).
14. See generallyPETER REUTER ET AL., RACKETEERING IN LEGITIMATE INDUSTRIES:
Two CASE STUDIES (1983) (discussing the economics of intimidation by racketeers in
legitimate business).
15. For an excellent exposition of organized crime racketeering, see generally
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LABORMANAGEMENT RACKETEERING IN THE UNITED STATES (1985). See also PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS AND LABOR
UNIONS (1986).

16. See, e.g., David Stout, With New Waste Commission, Mayor Vows to End 'Mob
Tax,' N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1996, at A39.

17. See City Ends Monopoly in Waste Collection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1947, at
All.
18. The mayor decided that the city's commercial waste hauling services were an
improper subsidy to a specific class of business. See REUTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 9.
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services-a seventy percent increase. 19 Cosa Nostra immediately organized
the dozens of small waste haulers into an effective cartel.2"
As early as 1958, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Improper
Activities in the Labor or Management Field ("McClellan Committee")
recognized that "underworld hoodlums . . . have attempted to build
business empires in the private carting industry through a monopoly system
enforced by trade associations and cooperative labor unions. ,2 The cartel
established a property rights system of customer allocation: each customer
belonged to a particular member; no other firm could compete for that
customer's business. If a rebel carter tried to "steal" a cartel member's
customer, or even attempt to enter the market without the cartel's
permission, that carter would face union problems, damage to his trucks,
threats of violence, and intimidation. 2 Without competition, the cartel
members imposed highly inflated waste hauling charges.
While the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs ("DCA")
had explicit authority to deny licenses to waste haulers lacking "good
character," it failed to use this power. 23 For example, in 1974, when the
Brooklyn DA's Office secured indictments against fifty-five waste hauling
firms,24 the DCA briefly considered denying licenses to these firms, but
ultimately granted them. 5 One City official was quoted as saying that the
Mayor's Office hoped it "would just blow over," and another official
explained the DCA's lax licensing procedures by stating "we didn't want

19.

See TRADE WASTE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE REDUCTION OF THE MAXIMUM
(1997) [hereinafter TRADE WASTE
COMMISSION].
20. Similar cartels were formed on Long Island. See United States v. Private
Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 811 F. Supp. 808, 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing organized
crime in Long Island waste hauling industry); Ralph Blumenthal, A 30-Year Reign; Mob
Ruling an Empire of Garbage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1988, § 4, at 6 (noting Westchester
waste hauling firms' links to organized crime).
21. Hearings Before The Select Committee on ImproperActivities in the Labor or
Management Field, 85th Cong. 6672 (1958) (statement of Sen. McClellan) [hereinafter
McClellan Committee].
22. See Peter Reuter, The CartageIndustry in New York, 18 J.CRIME &JUST., 149,
160 (1993) (observing damage to equipment); see also Allan R. Gold, U.S. Acts to End
Monopolies in New York Trash Hauling,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1991, at Al (describing how
violence and intimidation deterred outside waste haulers from entering market).
23. See Conference, supra note 5, at 373 (comparing DCA and TWC).
24. The indictments were the result of a two-year sting operation investigating illegal
restraint of trade in the Brooklyn waste hauling industry. In addition to the firms,
indictments were also brought against nine industry officials. See Frank J. Prial, 55 Carters
Are Charged with Brooklyn Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1974, at Al.
25. See David Bird, City May Take Indicted Carters' Routes, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1974, at Al; see also State Seeks to Curb Brooklyn Carters,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1974,
at A38.
LEGAL RATE FOR THE REMOVAL OF TRADE WASTE 6
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price wars and chaos in the industry. We didn't think that would protect
the public." 2 6 The DCA, more or less, functioned as a captive agency that
set high maximum rates that, in effect, served as the only rate for all
customers. New York City's regulated maximum rate27 of $14.70 per
cubic yard served as the only rate, and it was more than double the rates
in Boston ($5.30), Chicago ($4.49), Philadelphia ($4.25), and Los Angeles
($3.27).28 The DCA's maximum rate-setting power actually functioned to
strengthen the cartel.2 9 Worse still, the DCA helped to institutionalize and
bureaucratize the property rights/customer allocation system by regularly
approving and recording transfers of customers between waste hauling
firms.°

Cosa Nostra crushed rebel waste hauling firms with union problems,
intimidation, sabotage, and in at least one verified case on Long Island,
murder. 3 ' The result was that no national waste hauling firms were able to
compete for business in the country's largest market.3 2 Cosa Nostra made
it clear to customers that they had no say in choosing a firm to pick up their
waste. Commercial businesses that tried to break away from their assigned
waste hauler faced threats, intimidation, and property damage.33
Some of the most powerful Cosa Nostra figures, including Joseph
Gambino, the son of Gambino crime family boss Carlo Gambino, and
Matthew "Matty the Horse" Ianiello, an underboss in the Genovese crime
family, held open ownership interests in waste hauling firms. 34 However,

26. Bird, supra note 25.
27. See infra note 29 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.A.4 for a
description of the TWC's maximum rate-setting powers.
28. See REUTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 29-31.
29. Before the TWC, the DCA had the authority to set the legal maximum rate on
waste hauling charges. However, the DCA routinely approved large increases in the
maximum rate and operated on the assumption that the waste hauling firms would uniformly
charge that maximum rate. As a result, the legal maximum rate served as the only rate in
the industry. See EXECUTIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATION, infra note 109, at 13.
30. See REUTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 160-62.
31. See Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F. Supp. 963, 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing murder of waste hauler by a member of organized crime); see also John T.
McQuiston, Families of Slain Informants Awarded $10.8 Million, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1998, at B7 (describing successful tort suit by families of murdered waste haulers against
the Organized Crime Task Force for failing to adequately protect waste hauler informants).
32. See Matthew L. Wald, Trash Giant Makes Plans to Expand in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1993, at B5 (identifying New York as only major city with no national waste
hauler).
33. See REUTER E"AL., supranote 14, at 158-67 (detailing intimidation and violence
against customers).
34. See Arnold H. Lubasch, 19 Are Charged in City in Racketeering Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1985, at B3 (describing Ianiello's ownership interests); Arnold H.
Lubasch, UndercoverConcern Used in GarbageCase, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A26
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most of New York City's three hundred waste hauling firms were small,
family-owned enterprises; the largest had only twenty trucks." Since the
waste haulers themselves benefitted from the inflated prices, they also had
a stake in the cartel.
The Manhattan DA's Office uncovered the waste hauling cartel's
operation during a five year investigation that consisted of three undercover
operations. The first was launched after a rebel carter's truck was torched
in response to his refusal to return a waste hauling stop he acquired by
underbidding a cartel member.3 6 Rather than remaining silent, the rebel
carter reported the incident to the Department of Consumer Affairs, which
reported it to the Organized Crime Control Bureau of the New York City
Police Department. For the next three years, a detective assumed the role
of a family relative and manager of the rebel carting company and tape
recorded incriminating conversations with cartel members." The second
major undercover operation occurred when Browning-Ferris International
("BFI"), unable to gain a foothold in New York City's waste hauling
industry, agreed to allow an agent of the Manhattan DA's Office to pose
as a BFI employee.3 8 The agent was able to gather information from both
customers and the cartel members. BFI's entry into the market was also
important because it struck at the heart of the cartel. 39 The third operation
consisted of planting a police detective as the building manager at 55 Water
Street. 40 The Manhattan DA's Office targeted that building because it was
serviced by V. Ponte and Sons, the second largest waste hauling company
in New York City and believed to be one of the leading members of the
cartel. 4'
The investigations gathered valuable information on the cartel and
revealed how Cosa Nostra managed the cartel through four trade
associations made up of firms participating in the industry.42 Two of the
associations-the Kings County Trade Waste Association and the Greater
New York Waste Paper Association-were controlled by the Genovese

(noting Joseph Gambino's involvement in the waste hauling industry).
35. See REUTER ETAL., supra note 14, at 153-54, 161.
36.

See Selwyn Raab, When the Mafia Got Greedy, a Garbage Hauler Went

Undercover, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1996, at 37.

37. See id.
38. See Allen R. Myerson, The GarbageWars: Crackingthe Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 1995, § 3, at 1.
39. See Conference, supra note 5, at 313.
40. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Undercover Beat to Executive Suite: Case Over, He
Assumes the Life of His Assumed Identity, Nov. 30, 1997, at 37.

41. See id.
42. See Telephone Interview with Marybeth Richroath, Deputy Commissioner for
Enforcement, New York City Trade Waste Commission (Mar. 13, 1998).
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crime family.43 Two others-the Queens County Trade Waste Association
and the Association of Trade Waste Removers of Greater New York-were
run by the Gambino crime family.' The associations met weekly to
resolve disputes, assess fees, and manage the cartel.4 For instance, when
a carting company sold its route to another carting company, the
association received either one month's income on the route or two percent
on the sale, depending on the dollar value of the transaction. 46 If a rebel
carter "stole" a customer stop, the association would send someone to
collect a heavy "compensation" fee, typically thirty to thirty-five times the
monthly income generated by the stop.47 Perhaps the most notorious figure
involved was James "Jimmy Brown" Failla, a powerful capo in the
Gambino crime family, who ran the Association of Trade Waste Removers
of New York for over thirty years.
In June 1995, the Manhattan District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau
announced that his office had obtained a 114-count indictment against
twenty-three waste hauling firms, seventeen individuals, and four trade
associations for various racketeering offenses. 49 Most of the defendants
entered into plea bargains, including Angelo and Vincent Ponte, the owners
of V. Ponte & Sons. 0 The remaining two defendants were convicted in
1997 and received long prison sentences. 5'
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
NEW YORK CITY TRADE WASTE COMMISSION
The election as mayor of former U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani in
1993 triggered a sophisticated reexamination of the City's role as organized
crime fighter. The Giuliani Administration first moved against organized
crime in the Fulton Fish Market ("the Market"). Since the rise to power

43.

See id.

44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47.
48.

See id.
See Selwyn Raab, He Runs Trash Hauling with Silence andPastry, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 20, 1993, at A21.
49. See Indictment, People v. Association of Trade Waste Removers, Indictment No.
05614/95 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995).
50.

See Selwyn Raab, Trash CarterPleads Guilty to Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

28, 1997, at B2. In addition to time in prison for Angelo Pontes, the Pontes agreed to pay
$7.5 million and to a lifetime ban from the waste hauling industry. See id.
51.

See Selwyn Raab, Two Convicted as Leaders of New York Trash Cartel, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at B3; see also Mob LeaderOrdered to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1997, at B8.
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of Joseph "Socks" Lanza in the 1930s, the Fulton Fish Market's operations
were dominated by organized crime.52 Using evidence collected by
Operation Seaprobe, a joint federal-local investigation, U.S. Attorney
Giuliani filed a civil RICO suit against twenty-nine individual defendants,
including officials of the United Seafood Workers Local 359 (the union
local that controlled loading in the Market) and the Genovese crime family
and sought a federal court trusteeship over the entire Market.53
Most of the defendants entered into a consent agreement that allowed
for the appointment of a court-appointed administrator for the Market.54
While the administrator had wide-ranging powers to inspect records and
implement rules and regulations over the Market, the administrator made
clear that some form of sustained City-based regulatory
oversight would be
55
needed to purge Cosa Nostra from the Market. In 1995, Mayor Giuliani
successfully persuaded the City Council to pass Local Law 50, which
imposed licensing requirements, background checks, new loading and
parking procedures, and other regulations on vendors as well as employees
in the Market. Despite strong resistance from the Committee to Preserve
the Market and United Seafood Works Local 359, the City's licensing plan,
coupled with aggressive enforcement of its regulations, reduced loading and
unloading fees by seventy percent. By all indications the mob was purged
from the Market.56
The City's success in the Market, along with the new evidence
produced by the Manhattan DA's waste hauling investigation, led to the
creation of the Trade Waste Commission ("TWC") in 1996." 7 Regulating
the $1.5 billion New York City waste hauling industry was an ambitious
undertaking. Proponents of proposed Local Law 42, led by Mayor
Giuliani's Chief of Staff Randy Mastro,5" presented their case at City
Council hearings. Witnesses included the Manhattan District Attorney
Robert Morgenthau, Ronald Goldstock, the former director of the New

52. See LANZA, Joseph 'Socks' (1904-1968): Racket Boss of Fish Industry, in THE
181 (Carl Sifakis ed., 1987).
53. See United States v. Local 359, 705 F. Supp. 894, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
54. See Consent Agreement, United States v. Local 359, 87 Civ. 7351 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
55. See, e.g., Midterm Report of the Market Administrator, Consent Agreement,
United States v. Local 359, 87 Civ. 7351 (1990).
56. See Selwyn Raab, A Crackdown on Fees atFulton Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1997, at A28 (describing effects of reforms in Fulton Fish Market).
MAFIA ENCYCLOPEDIA

57. See Interview with Chad Vignola, Deputy Commissioner for Licensing &
Operations, New York City Waste Commission, in New York, N.Y. (Dec. 11, 1997)

[hereinafter Vignola].
58. Mastro worked under Giuliani in the U.S. Attorney's Office and was the lead
counsel in the federal government's historic civil RICO suit against the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. See JACOBS, BUSTING THE MOB, supra note 2, at 170.
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York State Organized Crime Task Force, and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani.
U.S. attorneys Mary Jo White (Southern District of New York) and
Zachary Carter (Eastern District of New York) and former New York State
Attorney General Dennis Vacco submitted written statements supporting the
proposed legislation.5 9 Commenting on the wave of indictments his office
secured against several major waste hauling figures, Morgenthau stated:
[I]ndictments alone cannot do the whole job. If we have learned
anything from our industry-wide investigations and prosecutions,
it is that systemic corruption must be addressed not only by the
criminal law, but by the regulatory structure.
Once law
enforcement has done its job, there must be a regulatory structure
in place with sufficient muscle behind it to ensure that systemic
corruption cannot return ... The licensing provisions [of Local
Law 42], together with the mandated background checks can, and
we believe will, help ensure that in order to do business in the City
the garbage man will be clean.'
In rebuttal, counsel for the Sanitation and Recycling Industry Council
of New York ("SRI") argued that the entire industry was being smeared,
and the SRI implied that proponents of the law favored large national
companies over small, local family-owned firms.6 ' Counsel for SRI also
impugned the character of Browning-Ferris International by charging that
it, or its subsidiaries, had committed civil and criminal violations. 6 He
argued that New York waste haulers charged more than haulers did in other
cities63 because labor costs were higher in New York. He also argued that
the proposed agency would be an expensive new bureaucracy, that the law
set unconstitutionally vague standards, and that the law gave "a government
appointee... power of life or death over who gets the work in this [waste
hauling] business ....,
Opponents also tried to mobilize political influence. Council member
Kenneth Fisher, a Democrat from Brooklyn who was the lead sponsor of

59. See Transcriptof the Minutes of the N.Y.City Council Committee on Consumer
Affairs 79 (Dec. 12, 1995) [hereinafter Transcript] (on file with the New York Law School

Law Review).
60. Id. at 84-85 (statement of Robert M. Morgenthau, Manhattan District Attorney).
61. See Transcriptof the Minutes of the N. Y. City Council Committee on Consumer
Affairs 133-34 (Mar. 4, 1996) (statement of Gerald Walpin, Counsel, Sanitation and
Recycling Industry Council) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
62. See id. at 110-13 (statement of Jeffrey Braun, Counsel, Sanitation and Recycling
Industry Council of New York).

63. See id. at 105-06.
64. Id. at 109.
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Local Law 42, reported a variety of pressures. "Major real estate players"
told him not to "rock the boat" by disturbing their clients' existing
sanitation services. 65 Small waste hauling firms all but admitted their
complicity in the cartel and pleaded that they could not compete otherwise.
Other opponents of Local Law 42 used more blunt tactics: Fisher was
labeled anti-Italian, his financial disclosure records were combed for
embarrassing information, and he was so seriously threatened that he
requested and received police protection. 66
Local Law 42 passed by a vote of forty-one to six on May 22, 1996.67
Finding that "the carting industry has been corruptly influenced by
organized crime for more than four decades [and] .. .has fostered and
sustained a cartel," Local Law 42 created a new commission with powers
intended to improve the city's ability to combat the cartel's influence in the
industry.68
III. THE STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION, AND POWERS OF THE TRADE
WASTE COMMISSION
A. The Trade Waste Commission andLocal Law 42
Local Law 42, which took effect in June 1996, established the TWC
and gave it broad regulatory powers. 69 According to the law, the
Commission's mission is to: "enhance the city's ability to address
organized crime corruption, to protect businesses who utilize private
carting services, and to increase competition in the carting industry with the
aim of reducing consumer prices." 7
The TWC is a regulatory agency that, in important respects, resembles
a law enforcement agency. Its staff of executive officers, attorneys,
auditors, inspectors, and police detectives was chosen for their collective
expertise in organized crime control. Its regulatory function is to eliminate
organized crime in a private
industry. The TWC's budget for fiscal year
71
1997 was $2,535,000.

65. See Telephone Interview with Council member Kenneth Fisher (Mar. 9, 1998).
66. See id.
67. See NewAgency Is to Regulate Trash Haulers, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at B2.
68. Intoductory Notes, N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit. 16-A, ch. 1 (1996).
69. In addition to the powers Local Law 42 granted, as an administrative body, the
TWC can and has promulgated rules regarding waste hauling. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY COMP.

R. tit. 17 (enumerating rules on the New York City trade waste industry).

16-A, ch. 1 (1996).

70.

Intoductory Notes, N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE tit.

71.

See THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, FISCAL YEAR 1998 EXECUTIVE BUDGET AND

PROJECTIONS, Ex. 2, at 239 (1997) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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The TWC consists of the Commissioner of Investigation, the
Commissioner of Business Services, the Commissioner of Consumer
Affairs, and the Commissioner of Sanitation, and is chaired by an executive
director appointed by the mayor.72 The executive staff brought a wealth of
experience in fighting organized crime to their positions. Both the
Executive Director and the Deputy Commissioner for Operations and
Licensing served as former assistant United States attorneys. They had
extensive experience implementing civil RICO trusteeships in the Fulton
Fish Market and in New York City union locals. 73 The Deputy
Commissioner for Enforcement previously served as an assistant Manhattan
district attorney and as deputy commissioner of the Department of
Investigations. In both jobs, she investigated and prosecuted organized
crime. The TWC's five lawyers all had experience either prosecuting or
investigating the waste hauling industry.75 The TWC also employs eight
accountants to audit records that waste hauling firms must now keep.7 6
Seven inspectors, many with backgrounds in the Department of Sanitation,
investigate violations of Local Law 42.7
Thirty police detectives from the New York City Police Department,
many of whom were recruited from the Organized Crime Control Bureau,
are assigned to the Trade Waste Commission.7 8 The police detectives have
two functions. First, they conduct background checks on waste hauling
firms to determine whether the firm or its principals have organized crime
ties.79 Second, they investigate complaints related to the waste hauling
industry. Like other police detectives, they have the authority to carry
weapons and make arrests.

72.

See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-502 (1996).

73. See Conference, supra note 5, at 368-69 (describing Executive Director's own
experience with civil RICO prosecutions); see also Vignola, supra note 57 (noting Deputy
Commissioner's background implementing civil RICO).
74. See Telephone Interview with Marybeth Richroath, Deputy Commissioner for
Enforcement, New York City Trade Waste Commission (Mar. 13, 1998) [hereinafter
Richroath].
75. Two attorneys came from the state Attorney General's Office and have experience
working on environmental violations and appellate litigation. The third attorney was a
former Assistant U.S. Attorney who had experience with organized crime investigations.
The fourth attorney was an attorney in the Corporation Counsel Office and advised the
Department of Sanitation. The fifth attorney worked at the Department of Consumer
Affairs on waste hauling issues. New York City's Corporation Counsel represents the TWC
in court appearances. See Vignola, supra note 57.
76.
77.

See Richroath, supra note 74.
See id.

78. See Vignola, supra note 57.
79. Background checks are now conducted as part of the application process to receive
a license. See infra Part II.A.3.
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1. Licensing
The TWC's most important power is its authority to issue or deny
licenses to waste hauling firms. To haul commercial waste, a carter must
obtain a license from the TWC.8" New York City's authority to issue waste
hauling licenses is a well-grounded police power. 8 ' Like the Department
to
of Consumer Affairs (DCA), the TWC has the power to deny a license
82
any applicant "who lacks good character, honesty, and integrity.)
Local Law 42 also completely revamped the license application
procedure. An applicant must provide information on its principals,83
defined as officers, directors, holders of over ten percent equity, and
relatives of such shareholders when the owner of record is acting on that
relative's behalf.84 In the event of a license denial, the TWC must state the
reasons and provide the applicant an opportunity to be heard. 85
Unlike the DCA, the TWC operates under a law that provides factors
that the agency must consider in determining
whether to grant a license.81
86
These factors include: prior convictions or pending criminal actions;
"knowing association with a person who has been convicted for a
racketeering activity"88 or with "any member or associate of an organized
crime group" as identified by a federal, state, or city law enforcement or
investigative agency; 8 9 and membership in trade associations that have been
convicted of specific crimes or trade associations in which a member of an
organized crime group holds a position.' °
2. Voiding Waste Hauling Contracts
When the TWC was established, about 300 waste hauling firms were
operating in New York City. On June 3, 1996, Local Law 42 declared all
commercial waste hauling contracts terminable-at-will by the customer on

80. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE
81. See infra Part III.
82. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE

§

16-505(a) (1996).

§ 16-509(a) (1996).

83. See id. § 16-508(a)(i).
84. See id. § 16-501(d).

85. See id. § 16-509(a).
86. See id. § 16-509(a)(iii).
87. See id. § 16-509(a)(ii).
88. Id. § 16-509(a)(v).
89. Id. § 16-509(a)(vi).
90. See id. §§ 16-509(a)(viii), 16-520(j)(i). These provisions were clearly intended

as an attack on Cosa Nostra's use of trade associations.
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thirty days notice. 9' At one stroke, this move dismantled the property
rights system that, for decades, had tied customers to their carters. Waste
haulers could apply to the TWC for an exemption or waiver from this
onerous provision. On waiver determinations, Local Law 42 stated:
In determining in its discretion whether a waiver of the termination
would be consistent with the purposes of this act, the commission
shall consider background information concerning the business and
its principals and the full circumstances surrounding the
negotiation or administration of such contracts, including but not
limited to the form and content thereof. 92
The "purposes of this act" referred to eliminating anti-competitive
practices, the cartel, and Cosa Nostra. 93 Of 212 waiver applications, the
TWC granted 40 applications and denied 160; the remaining applicants
failed to provide requested information or withdrew their applications
before the TWC could make a final decision. 94
3. Background Investigations
The TWC has broad powers to conduct background investigations
related to its license and waiver decisions. 95 It may request information on
criminal investigations,' tax records,' real property,98 indebtedness, prior
trade waste business interests," ° and "such additional information
concerning good character, honesty and integrity that the commission may
deem appropriate ...."10' This scrutiny continues even after a carter is
granted a license: The agency has authority to conduct unannounced
inspections and audits of records that the licensee is required to keep.' 02 If

91. See Conference, supra note 5, at 373.
92. NEW YORK, N.Y., Loc. L. No.42 § II(iii) (June 3, 1996) (emphasis added).
93.
94.
95.

See id. § 1.
See Vignola, supra note 57.
See generally N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE

§ 16-508(b) (1996) (listing the
requirements in connection with an application).
96. See id. § 16-508(b)(ii)(j).
97. See id. § 16-508(b)(ii)(k).
98. See id. § 16-508(b)(ii)(c).
99. See id. § 16-508(b)(ii)(b).
100. See id. § 16-508(b)(ii)(m).
101. Id. § 16-508(b)(ii)(n).
102. See id. §§ 16-504(c), (d); see also Conference, supra note 5, at 511 (discussing
advantages of surprise audits).
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the TWC finds that a carter violated Local Law 42, it can immediately
revoke or suspend a license.'° 3
4. Setting Maximum Rates
The TWC used its rate-setting authority to attack the cartel. Local Law
42 authorized the TWC to: "[Flix by rule and from time to time refix
maximum and minimum rates ... which rates shall be based upon a fair
and reasonable return to the licensees and shall protect those using the
services of such licensees from excessive or unreasonable charges."' In
the rate-setting process, the law authorized the TWC to "compel the
attendance at a public hearing held pursuant to a rate-fixing rule-making of
licensees and other persons having information in their possession" about
waste hauling." 5 The TWC has the additional power to "compel the
production of books and records" in relation to the hearing'' and
6 to "require
licensees to file with the commission schedules of rates. 0
While some reformers opposed giving the TWC permanent maximum
rate-setting authority, 0 7 others argued that until a free market developed,
a maximum rate would restrain the cartel. As Randy Mastro, Giuliani's
chief-of-staff and later the interim director of the TWC, explained in his
testimony before the City Council:
[A]s the Commission succeeds in its work of ridding the industry
of corruption, of thereby helping to foster an increased
competition, and through that increased competition reducing
cost[s] . . . the authority to set [a] maximum rate will be less
important, less vital, certainly something that the Commission
would revisit and that all of us will look at over time. But the fact
of the matter is that, in the first instance . . . the ability of this
Commission to set a maximum rate and thereby prevent firms that
have historically acted in a corrupt manner . . . that that is a
necessary ... enforcement mechanism in going forward ....

103.

See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-513 (1996).

104. Id. § 16-519.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Transcript, supranote 59, at 200 (statement of Philip Angell, Assistant
to the Chairman, Brown-Ferris International).

108.

Id. at 45-46 (statement of Randy Mastro, Chief of Staff, Giuliani

Administration).
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The TWC waited several months before exercising its power to fix
maximum rates. In making its decision, the TWC found:
The proposed rate reduction will hasten the exodus of the
organized crime families that historically have controlled the New
York City trade waste industry by slashing the windfall profits
they have reaped from decades of anti-competitive conduct.
Moreover, this rate reduction will significantly reduce the annual
trash bills of New York City businesses and thereby lower the
costs of doing business in the City. At the same time, waste
removal companies that operate honestly and efficiently will be
able to recover their costs and earn an attractive return on their
capital.' 9
In recommending the new maximum rate of $11.74 per cubic yard, the
executive staff also predicted that the maximum rate would "exceed the
average rates currently being negotiated and agreed upon in the newly
competitive market."" 0 The prediction is borne out by the 1998 market
rate of $8.70 per cubic yard-forty-one percent less than the old cartel rate
of $14.70 per cubic yard and well below the TWC's maximum rate of
$11.74 per cubic yard."'
5. Regulating Contracting and Billing Practices
Local Law 42 regulated the terms of private contracts in the waste
hauling industry and limited their duration to two years. " 2 Form contracts
must be approved by the TWC and must conform to standards that prevent
misleading contracting language and hidden clauses. Furthermore, the
firms must bill in a way that makes clear to customers their legal rights and
the specific charges for various waste hauling services." 3 Customers may
also terminate contracts within three months if their carter assigns their
waste hauling contract to another firm, and the TWC must approve all sales
and transfers of contracts." 4

109.

TRADE WASTE COMMISSION, EXECUTIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATION TO THE

TRADE WASTE COMMISSION REGARDING THE MAXIMUM LEGAL RATE FOR THE REMOVAL
OF TRADE WASTE 2 (Dec. 19, 1996) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATION].

110. Id.
111. See infra Part IV.B.
112. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 16-520(e)(i) (1996).
113. Seeid. §§ 17-5-01, 17-5-04, 17-5-05.

114.

See id. § 17-5-05(b)(1).
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6. Role of Independent Monitors
If the background licensing check reveals "adverse information," the

TWC may issue the license on the condition that the firm retain an
independent monitor to oversee the firm's finances and activities."' Some
monitors to "pre-qualify"
waste hauling companies have used private sector
6
license."
a
for
applying
before
themselves
IV. STRATEGIC INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE TWC
A. Adopting Market-OrientedPolicies
The TWC recognized that simply purging cartel members from the
industry would not be sufficient. The long-term remedy for racketeering
requires creation of a free market in waste hauling. To achieve this goal,
the TWC had to attract new firms into the market. One strategy was to
inform customers of their right to choose their waste hauler and to
encourage these customers to compare the prices and services of various
carters.
Toward this end, as part of the license and waiver application process,
waste hauling firms have to provide a list of their customers' names and
addresses. 1 ' 7 With this information, the TWC has the ability to notify

115. See id. § 16-511(b). The idea of using an "independent inspector general" to
prevent criminal activities within a firm has been most thoroughly developed by Ronald
Goldstock:
An IPSIG [Independent Private Sector Inspector General Program] operates as a
team with legal, auditing, investigative, management, research, analytic, loss
prevention and other appropriate skills to ensure compliance with relevant law and
regulations to deter, prevent, and detect unethical and illegal conduct by, within,
and against the host organization .... [T]he IPSIG must remain independent,
autonomous and self-sufficient, and, although interactive with the organization,
unconstrained by organizational biases which might seek to protect the corporate
reputation at the expense of exposing illegal or unethical behavior. To ensure the
IPSIG's integrity and credibility as an independent agent, it must have dual
reporting responsibility-to the highest levels of the company . . . and to an
independent body whether it be an agency of government or an outside Board of
Directors.
Ronald Goldstock, IPSIG: The IndependentPrivateSectorInspectorGeneralProgram,
4 CORP. CONDUCT Q. 38, 38 (1996).
116. See Conference, supra note 5, at 382.
117. The customers' names and addresses are entered into a computer database, and
any licensed waste hauling firm can request lists sorted by zip code. The names and
addresses of the former customers of a firm that was denied a license are sent to new license
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customers that their carter was denied a license and would have to cease
providing waste hauling services. Customers are informed that there are
now over 300 carting companies permitted to collect waste, and they are
advised either to seek another company servicing their neighborhood, by
consulting the Yellow Pages, or calling the TWC to find out how to contact
licensed carters. 1 8 The notice informs customers of the maximum rate and
of their rights under Local Law 42, and it encourages them to solicit at
least four bids." 9 The TWC has set up telephone help lines for Spanish,
Mandarin/Cantonese, and Korean speakers. 120 The agency's detectives
investigate complaints of intimidation within twenty-four hours and seek to
convince customers and haulers alike that the days of mob rule are over.'21
New firms have entered the market, including the biggest companies in the
business-BFI, WMX, and USA Waste."2
B. The Results of the TWC's Work
Within months the TWC's work began to show positive results. Waste
hauling rates fell significantly across the city. The 1997 average market
rate of $8.70 per cubic yard was forty-one percent less than the old cartel
rate of $14.70 per cubic yard, and there were many examples of substantial
savings. By 1997, the World Trade Center's annual waste hauling bill
Columbia Presbyterian
plummeted from $3 million to $600,000.1'
Hospital's charges dropped from $1.2 million to $480,000.124 At 26
Federal Plaza, home of many federal agencies such as the Department of
Justice, the waste hauling bill fell from $369,000 to $130,000.125 In the
Fulton Fish Market, wholesale waste hauling prices dropped
26 over eighty
percent, from $46 per cubic yard to $9.50 per cubic yard. 1

applicants. To gather information on the effects of a license denial decision, the TWC
surveys the former customers. See Vignola, supra note 57.
118. See, e.g., Notice from Edward T. Ferguson, III, Chair and Executive Director,
New York City Trade Waste Commission, to Customers of V.A. Sanitation Inc. Regarding
Termination of Carting Service (June 13, 1997).
119.

See id.

120. See Letter from Edward T. Ferguson, III, Chair and Executive Director, New
York City Trade Waste Commission, to Former Customer of Litod Paper Stock Corp. (July
30, 1997).
121. See Vignola, supra note 57.
122. See Conference, supra note 5, at 360, 383-86 (describing entry into market of
national waste hauling firms).
123. See EXECUTIVE STAFF RECOMMENDATION, supra note 109, at 15.
124. See id.

125. See id.
126. See id.
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These reductions have provided a boost for the city's myriad of small
business owners. For example, the estimated annual savings for the
average newsstand was $750, for bakeries $800, for produce markets
$1,330, and for delicatessens $5,418.127 The overall estimated annual
savings reduction is over $330 million.a2 The ripple effects for New York
City's economy in terms of new hiring and expansion are undetermined but
certainly significant. Consumers benefit as well by lower prices for goods
and services.' 29
In applauding the savings to the businesses and people of New York,
we should not lose sight of another benefit: the economic loss to organized
crime. Along with their relentless criminal court defeats (e.g., the recent
conviction of Vincent "The Chin" Gigante, boss of the Genovese crime
family),130 New York's Cosa Nostra crime families are now forced to
contend with the loss of a significant revenue source and power base.
V. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE

TWC

It is not surprising that Local Law 42 and the TWC have provoked a
number of state and federal constitutional and administrative law
challenges. Although the lawsuits have raised a number of interesting
issues, the courts have almost uniformly held in the TWC's favor, thus
establishing the agency's solid legal foundations.
A. ConstitutionalChallenges to the TWC
The constitutionality of the TWC was upheld in SanitationRecycling
Industry, Inc. v. City of New York. "' The plaintiff, Sanitation and
Recycling Industry, asked for a declaratory judgment holding Local Law
42 unconstitutional on grounds of impairment of contract, due process,
vagueness, freedom of association, and privacy.
The Second Circuit's decision, upholding District Court Judge Milton
Pollack's grant of summary judgment for the City, recognized the extensive
racketeering that had dominated the waste hauling market for half a

127. See

TRADE

WASTE

COMMISSION,

ESTIMATED

ANNUAL

SAVINGS

FROM

REDUCTIONS INTRADE WASTE COLLECTION COSTS (1997) (on file with the New York Law

School Law Review).

128. See TRADE WASTE COMMISSION, POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN NEW YORK CITY'S
TRADE WASTE COLLECTION INDUSTRY (1997) (on file with the New York Law School Law
Review).
129. See Vignola, supra note 57.
130. See United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
131. 107 F.3d 985 (2d Cir. 1997).
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century. 132 The Second Circuit rejected each of the plaintiff's claims. With
respect to the argument that Local Law 42's termination of all waste
hauling contracts violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
the court noted that waste hauling was already heavily regulated and that
haulers could have anticipated such a regulation. 133 The court focused on
the broad societal goal in passing Local Law 42-the elimination of
organized crime-and found that the contract termination provisions were
a reasonable means to achieve that end. The waste haulers argued that the
waiver provisions were impermissibly vague, that the independent monitor
provision was standardless, and that the whole scheme denied them an
opportunity to be heard. The court found that economic regulations will
be upheld unless they are impermissibly vague in all of their applications.
Judged by that standard, the court found that the law's directions regarding
license application decisions were sufficiently definite. The court pointed
to Local Law 42's directions to the TWC to make waiver decisions based
on the goal of eliminating organized crime from the irndustry and the law's
specific instruction to the TWC to consider background information on the
applicant and the circumstances of the contract negotiation. In rejecting the
claim that the lack of a formal hearing denied due process, the court noted
that the TWC had provided haulers an opportunity to respond and, in any
a legitimate property interest in a waiver
event, that the
34 plaintiffs lacked
application. 1
The Second Circuit also held that Local Law 42's provisions banning
membership in organizations with ties to organized crime'35 "may be
applied to associations that occur in connection with the waste disposal36
business without transgressing on the freedom of intimate association."'
However, the Second Circuit construed these provisions narrowly, holding:
"When an applicant is shown to have knowingly associated with a person
of prohibited status, the Commission must satisfy itself that the contact was
improper under the City law in order for the associational conduct to serve
as a basis for the denial of a license., 137 As for the provision limiting
membership in organizations with ties to organized crime, the court
interpreted the law to mean that membership is prohibited only if the
licensee knows or should have known that a person holding a position in
the organization has "been convicted of being or is a member of an

132. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
133. See Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993
(2d Cir. 1997).
134. See id. at 995.
135. See infra Part III.A.1.
136. Sanitation & Recycling Indus., Inc., 107 F.3d at 996.
137. Id. at 998.

1088

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

organized crime group.""'8 While the court did not formally rule on the
issue, the court indicated that it would likely have rejected the claim that
the disclosure of confidential information violates privacy rights.' 39
District Court Judge Milton Pollack decided a second constitutional
challenge in TWC's favor. In Universal Sanitation Corp v. Trade Waste
Commission of the City of New York, 40 the TWC denied a waiver
application to two waste hauling firms principally owned by Benny Villani,
whom the government alleged was affiliated with the Genovese crime
family. Federal prosecutors had indicted Villani and his waste hauling
firms on federal racketeering charges. 41 The TWC determined that it
would not be consistent with the purposes of Local Law 42 to allow Villani
a waiver because of his pending racketeering charges, his alleged affiliation
with the Genovese crime family, and his firm's past contracting practices.
These practices included the use of evergreen42 clauses which allowed
contracts to renew themselves every five years. 1
In granting the TWC summary judgment, Judge Pollack cited
SanitationRecycling's rejection of the contracts clause claim. 143 As for the
argument that the TWC's actions violated the takings clause, the court
found that while the termination clause of Local Law 42 may have
substantially diminished the value of the firms' contracts, the firms could
not show that their investment-backed expectations were infringed because
the contracts were related to business dealings in an industry that was
already heavily regulated.'" The court rejected the procedural due process
claim on the ground that the firms did not have a property right in the
waiver itself but merely a unilateral desire to obtain one. 45 The firms
argued that they had been deprived of a liberty interest without due process
in that their waiver applications called into question their integrity and good
name. The court reiterated that waiver decisions were within the discretion
of the TWC and that rejection of the firm's waiver application did not

138.

Id. at 999.

139. See id. at 1000.
140. 940 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
141.

See id. at 660.

142. See id. The waste hauling firms also challenged the waiver decision, alleging
that it violated the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause, denied them procedural due
process, was unconstitutionally vague, and constituted a bill of attainder. See id. The firms
also made a claim under state law, arguing that the decision violated Article 78 of the New
York State Civil Practice Law and Rules. See id.

143. See id. at 661 (citing Sanitation and Recycling Indus. Inc. v. City of New York,
928 F. Supp. 407, 413-416 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).

144. See Universal Sanitation Corp. v. Trade Waste Comm'n, 940 F. Supp. 656, 661
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
145. See id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)).
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implicate a legal right or status. 146 As for the vagueness challenge, the
court held that the direction to make license decisions "consistent with the
purposes of [Local Law 42]" was a sufficiently informative standard for an
administrative agency. 147 The court also rejected the claim that Local Law
42 constituted a bill of attainder because it "furthers legitimate non-punitive
legislative purposes, does not confiscate property, and does not bar
designated individuals or groups from participating in the carting
industry. "148
As for the state law claim that TWC's administrative decision violated
Article 78 (the New York state law that governs administrative bodies), the
court held that the TWC's decision was not "arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion." 49 The court found that Villani's indictment and the
presence of evergreen clauses in the company's standard form contracts
provided a rational basis for the decision.'
B. Administrative Law Challenges to the TWC
To date, the courts have supported the TWC on each of three state law
claims challenging license denials and all but one of the federal and state
claims challenging the TWC's waiver decisions.' 5 ' The only court decision
that did not constitute a total TWC victory was FrankLomangino & Sons,
Inc. v. City of New York.' 52 In Lomangino, while the plaintiffs'
constitutional challenges were dismissed on summary judgment, their state
law Article 78 challenge to a waiver denial was allowed to proceed.,5' The
plaintiffs alleged that their waiver applications had been denied while those
of similarly situated applicants had been successful.' 54 To test the claim,
the court determined that the plaintiffs needed access to the successful
146. See id. at 662.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150.

See id.

151. See Fava v. City of New York, No. CV-97-0179 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1997);
Universal Sanitation Corp. v. Trade Waste Comm'n, 940 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Vigliotti Bros. Carting Co. v. Trade Waste Comm'n, 648 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1996); D&D
Carting Co. v. City, 658 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 18, 1997); Green Bay
Sanitation Corp. v. City, 658 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 18, 1997); Mr.
N Carting Corp. v. NYC TWC, Index No. 10148/97 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 26,
1997); Falso Carting v. NYC TWC, Index No. 101407/97 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Feb. 24,
1997).
152. 980 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
153. The Second Circuit had granted summary judgment for the TWC on the
plaintiff's federal constitutional claims but denied it on the Article 78 claim. See id. at 678.

154. See id.
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applications for waivers. The plaintiffs were permitted to view the
successful waiver applications of ten waste hauling firms.' 55 Of the seven
plaintiffs, the court found that five had engaged in substantially more
serious violations than the firms in the comparison group, comprised of the
successful applicants. However, the court found that two plaintiffs had
significantly similar records as those of the comparison group. 56
' The court
rejected the argument by the TWC that the proper solution was to rescind
the waivers for the successful firms. Instead the court remanded the two
plaintiffs' applications to the TWC for reconsideration. 5 7
Morgenthau v. Allocca5 8 also considered the TWC's policy-making
authority. In February 1997, Crest, a waste hauling firm, and Polidori, its
president, pled guilty to one felony racketeering charge. As part of the
plea bargain, Polidori had to sell his interest in the firm. However, the
TWC ordered that the defendant's license application be processed before
it considered Polidori's application to sell the company to USA Waste.15 9
Since the license application would now surely be rejected, Crest would
have no license and the firm's value would be destroyed. The matter was
complicated by the TWC's prior decision that it intended to process sales
applications first in order to induce waste hauling firms to enter the New
York City market by purchasing already existing waste hauling firms
intact.'6o
In June 1997, Crest was sold to USA Waste, subject to approval of the
sales application. However, in a regularly-scheduled TWC meeting in May
1997, the TWC changed its procedure. It decided to make case-by-case
decisions as to whether the license or sales application would be processed
first. The agency explained that head-to-head competition should take
place now that many of the cartel members had left the market, and that the
sale of customer accounts obtained through the cartel system should no
longer always be considered in the public interest. Polidori argued that the
change in policy amounted to the adoption of a regulation which, according

155. See id. There was vitriolic debate about the selection of the comparison group.
It turned out that one of the comparison group's waste haulers had previously been denied
a waiver and that another firm's waiver was being reviewed in light of new allegations. See
id.

156. See id. at 679.
157. After their claim was remanded to the TWC for reconsideration, the plaintiffs

failed to pursue it further. See Vignola, supra note 57.
158. 1998 WL 250553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). While the case grew out of the
criminal prosecutions brought by the Manhattan District Attorney's Office, see supra Part
I, the court considered this motion for an injunction against the TWC to be an administrative
law challenge. See Morgenthau v. Allocca, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1997, at 26.
159. See Morgenthau v. Allocca, 1998 WL 250553 at *2.
160. See infra Part III.
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to the City Administrative Procedure Act (CAPA) ,161 required notice and
hearing.16 2 The TWC countered that the case-by-case decision making is
not a formal rule change that requires compliance with CAPA.
The court ruled for the TWC, holding that the agency's previous
procedure was a "temporary view" and that the new TWC policy was not
a fixed general principle and thus did not fit the definition of a "rule" under
article IV, section 8 of the New York State Constitution.' 63 Crest
alternatively argued that in the past the TWC permitted other waste hauling
firms' license applications to be decided after their sales application,
thereby allowing them to cash in on their cartel membership. The court
distinguished Polidori's case by finding that the TWC had never approved
a sales application before a license application for a convicted waste hauler.
The court also found that the TWC's decision to change its policy was not
arbitrary and capricious because market conditions had changed
dramatically in the time since its original policy. This case demonstrates
the willingness of the state courts to give TWC substantial deference.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE TWC AND THE FUTURE OF THE CITY AS

ORGANIZED CRIME FIGHTER
New York City's experience with the TWC will provide invaluable
lessons about how to use local government's regulatory powers to battle
organized crime. In fact, the TWC is already a model for other
municipalities: Westchester County, New York is holding hearings on the
possibility of creating its own trade waste commission to combat a local
waste hauling cartel. 16 In a prescriptive light, we offer the following
preliminary conclusions.
In designing new anti-organized crime regulations, a local government
cannot assume that just any government initiative will work. As we saw
with the DCA, a grant of authority is meaningless if that authority is not
exercised to fight organized crime. It is probably necessary to create a new
regulatory body or branch that is singularly focused on fighting organized
crime rather than on regulating the industry. That agency needs to be
staffed with individuals with the expertise and ambition to challenge a
powerful and entrenched organized crime regime. In the case of organized
crime cartels, a long-term solution also requires attracting new competition-

161. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 45 (1989).
162. See id. § 1043.
163. See Morgenthau, 1998 WL 250553 at *3.
164. See Donna Greene, HearingsBegin on CartingIndustry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
1997, Westchester edition, § 14, at 1.
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minded firms that are not intimidated by the industry's reputation of being
run by the mob.
Politically, City crime-fighting officials will encounter entrenched
interests allied with organized crime. Every agency action will be closely
scrutinized by attorneys representing the cartel's interests. The City can
do two things to enhance the likelihood that its actions will survive court
challenges. First, documenting organized crime's presence and activities
is extremely valuable; it forces courts to confront the problem that the
strong remedies are intended to solve. Second, the closer the City stays
within its traditional administrative and police powers, the less likely court
challenges will succeed. In short, it is very difficult to argue persuasively
that the City cannot innovate in a heavily regulated, mob-dominated
industry.
By attacking organized crime at its root, the TWC has done what
individual convictions could never do: end an industry cartel. Based on
its tangible results, the TWC is becoming one of the most successful local
government, anti-organized crime initiatives in the country. Waste-hauling
rates have fallen dramatically, helping business and consumers. More
importantly, as the structure of Cosa Nostra disintegrates under the
pounding of criminal prosecutions, one of its primary bases of power is
being dismantled by effective regulation. The TWC is showing how
municipal government can use its regulatory powers to complement state
and federal law enforcement's attacks on organized crime.
The true test of the TWC, however, will not come until the next
mayoral administration. The TWC "works" with the full support of Mayor
Giuliani, a former U.S. attorney, and with a staff comprised of his former
aides as well as others experienced at fighting the mob. When the next
administration changes the TWC's staff, will the agency lose its focus and
competence? Unfortunately, the history of public administration is littered
with stories of reform agencies that have been co-opted and even corrupted.

